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Abstract—Transactive energy systems (TES) are emerging as a
transformative solution for the problems that distribution system
operators face due to an increase in the use of distributed energy
resources and rapid growth in scalability of managing active
distribution system (ADS). On the one hand, these changes pose
a decentralized power system control problem, requiring strategic
control to maintain reliability and resiliency for the community
and for the utility. On the other hand, they require robust
financial markets while allowing participation from diverse pro-
sumers. To support the computing and flexibility requirements of
TES while preserving privacy and security, distributed software
platforms are required. In this paper, we enable the study
and analysis of security concerns by developing Transactive
Energy Security Simulation Testbed (TESST), a TES testbed
for simulating various cyber attacks. In this work, the testbed
is used for TES simulation with centralized clearing market,
highlighting weaknesses in a centralized system. Additionally,
we present a blockchain enabled decentralized market solution
supported by distributed computing for TES, which on one hand
can alleviate some of the problems that we identify, but on the
other hand, may introduce newer issues. Future study of these
differing paradigms is necessary and will continue as we develop
our security simulation testbed.
Index Terms—Cyber-attacks, Transactive Energy Systems,
Cyber-Physical Security, Simulation Platform, Testbed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transactive energy systems (TES) have emerged as an antic-
ipated outcome of the shift in the electricity industry, moving
from centralized, monolithic business models characterized by
bulk generation and one-way delivery, toward a decentralized
hierarchical model in which end-users can play a more active
role in both energy production and consumption [1], [2]. In
the U.S., 36% of electricity demand is from single-family
houses, which can contribute an even larger share during
summer peak due to the usage of air-conditioning [3]. The
development of smart home devices enables the deployment
of TES to provide a more efficient and secure solution.
There are a number of well-documented factors contributing
to this shift, including the increasing penetration of distributed
energy resources, growing number of control variables in
the active distribution system, increasing deterioration and
fragility of the existing grid, the regulatory and public mandate
for environmental awareness, and general social trends toward
the democratization of services as exemplified by the “sharing
economy” [4].
TES involving responsive load and distributed generators
have received significant attention in the literature. In [3], a
transactive control approach is proposed to coordinate heating,
ventilation, and air-conditioning systems to reduce load con-
sumption. A distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP)
algorithm is developed to provide a price signal to relax
congestion issues in systems with electric vehicles that can act
as prosumers in [5]. A coordination method that can manage
energy imbalance problems considering thermostatically con-
trollable load is presented in [6]. An automated decentralized
control scheme is introduced to provide ancillary and demand
response services in [7]. A TES that could maximize resource
utilization and balance demand and supply is proposed in [8],
[9]. A TES that allows direct control of unit consumption
through an aggregator is introduced in [10]. A double-auction
market scheme that utilizes transactive controllers to operate
the distribution system is designed in [11].
The transactive market can be implemented with multiple
possible architectures. Most of the architecture will be hi-
erarchical and can have alternate architecture at a different
voltage level. Prosumers can coordinate with aggregators or
campus grid, and aggregators/campus grid can coordinate
with distribution system operators. DSO can coordinate with
transmission system operators to optimize resources in the
best possible way. We consider two different architectures: 1)
hierarchical with centralized market clearing and 2) hierarchi-
cal with a mix of centralized and distributed market clearing
enabled by enhanced communication. First architecture is well
explored in literature but not much for security analysis. In-
formation exchange between prosumers and a system operator
or aggregators happens through a large number of distributed
edge-computing and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. TES
communication is conducted with digital infrastructure and
requires interfacing with edge-devices, which have possible
vulnerabilities and attacks especially with financial interest
motives. The main actors are the consumers, which com-
prise primarily residential loads and prosumers who also
have distributed energy resources (DERs), such as rooftop
solar batteries or flexible loads capable of demand/response.
Additionally, a distribution system operator (DSO) manages
the network with possible additional interface with microgrid
operator or campus grid operators and with prosumers directly
or through aggregators.
For second architecture, such installations are equipped with
an advanced metering infrastructure consisting of TE-enabled
smart meters. In addition to the standard functionalities of
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Fig. 1. Architecture of TESST.
smart meters (i.e., the ability to measure line voltages, power
consumption and net metering, and to communicate these to
the distribution system operator), TE-enabled smart meters
are capable of communicating with other smart meters, have
substantial onboard computational resources, and are able to
access the Internet and cloud computing services as needed.
Examples of such installations include the well-known Brook-
lyn Microgrid Project, [12] and the Sterling Ranch learning
community (currently under development) [13].
The research community is increasingly advocating the use
of distributed ledgers in TES, including our earlier work [14].
Blockchain technology enables the digital representation of
energy and financial assets and their secure transfer from one
set of parties to another. By design, the security of this value
transfer is guaranteed by the interaction protocol itself and
obviates the need for trusted transaction intermediaries. The
execution of smart contracts (i.e., code that captures the market
logic and participants’ roles) is automated and guaranteed [15],
[16]. Additionally, the blockchain constitutes an immutable,
complete, and fully auditable record of all transactions that
have occurred within the system. These properties ensure
market transparency, as well as the availability of a detailed
market load profile and grid utilization data.
Problem: In this paper, we specifically consider the problem
of security in a transactive energy system. Unlike traditional
power grid operation, the participation of the prosumers at
the edge raises several concerns. The first concern is privacy:
if private data is stored in a way that is easily accessible to
unauthorized entities, it can leak private information. Consider
that the transaction level data can provide much greater
insights into a prosumers behavior compared to smart meter
data [17]. Similarly, the market is an integral part of a TES.
Hence, it is important that the market remains fair and cannot
be manipulated. Consider the problem of a set of prosumers
promising to supply energy at a lower bid and then choosing
not to supply the power at the scheduled time.
Contributions: To systematically study these adverse sce-
narios, we must have access not only to a power system
simulator but also to a system that can simulate market mech-
anisms, including distributed ledgers if they are integrated.
In this paper, we build on the transactive energy simulation
platform (TESP) developed by the Pacific Northwest National
Lab (PNNL). We extended the TESP platform to study security
scenarios by incorporating different attacks. We call this
testbed the Transactive Energy Security Simulation Testbed
(TESST). We highlight weaknesses in TES with a hierarchical
and centralized market clearing system. Then, we discuss how
some of these problems can be alleviated by the use of a
decentralized market solution based on our earlier work [14].
Future work includes detailed security analysis for the ledger
enabled TESP and integrating a suite of attack scenarios that
can be used by the research community.
II. TESST: TES TESTBED FOR CYBER ATTACK
SIMULATION
Transactive Energy Security Simulation Testbed (TESST) is
built upon the Transactive Energy Simulation Platform (TESP)
by PNNL and TRANSAX designed by Vanderbilt University
[14], [18]. The TESP platform is interfaced with Network
Simulator 3 (NS3) to simulate cyber attacks on the TES [19],
[20] (please see Figure 1).
A. Physical System
The physical system includes a modified IEEE 9 bus system
and a distribution feeder connected at bus 7. The transmission
system is modeled in PyPower and includes four fossil based
generating units. The cost of the unit connected at bus 9 is
higher than the other units. There are also three varying loads
connected at buses 5, 7 and 9. The distribution system is
modeled with Gridlab-D and EnergyPlus. In this distribution
feeder, the 1.3MW unresponsive load is connected at 12.47KV
voltage level. The building load is also connected to that
voltage level through a 12.47kV/480V transformer. There are
also 30 houses that are equipped with PV panels and Heating,
Fig. 2. Feeder diagram. Brown nodes are feeder junctions, numbered 1 to
11 from top to bottom. Black nodes are the overcurrent relays, which ensure
that the total power flowing in and out of the feeder is below 20 kW. The
green nodes are the junction points for the producers (5), and the red nodes
are junction points for the consumers (97). There are 102 prosumers in total.
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Fig. 3. Load profile (i.e., total consumption) and generation profile (i.e., total
production) in kWh per 15 minute interval aggregated across the microgrid.
Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems, which are
connected to the feeder through a 7200V/120V transformer.
Moreover, a microgrid that containing 102 homes across 11
feeders (5 producers and 97 consumers) is also built. The
feeder structure and its safety limits are plotted in Fig. 2.
B. Transactive Energy Market
Two trading options are designed for the TESST. The
transactive energy market has one option with a centralized
market clearing and settlement and the second has decentral-
ized market clearing and settlements.
1) Centralized Market Option: The centralized option uti-
lizes a double-auction market mechanism and aims to provide
a trading platform for prosumers in both transmission and
distribution systems. Both suppliers and consumers submit
their bids to the TES management platform, and the market
uses the auction to determine the clearing price which is
published through the network to all participants.
The consumer bids are from smart HVAC controllers, which
will adjust bid price and quantity based on the most recent
cleared price and the average and standard deviation of the
cleared price over the preceding 24 hours. They can also adjust
the temperature settings to earn more savings. For example,
the adjustment process under cooling mode is described in
Fig. 4. Smart HVAC controller mechanism in cooling mode.
Figure 4. The smart HVAC controller will adjust bid based on
current temperature and adjust temperature setting based on
current cleared price using the following two equations:
TSet = TTarget +
(PClear − PMean) · |Tmax/min|
σT · σP (1)
PBid = PMean +
(TCurrent − TTarget) · σT · σP
|Tmax/min| (2)
where TSet is the new adjusted temperature setpoint; TTarget is
the target temperature setpoint; PClear is the received cleared
price; PMean is the average price over the last 24 hours; Tmax
and Tmin are the maximum and minimum acceptable tempera-
ture; σT and σP are the standard deviation of temperature and
price, respectively; PBid is the bid price from HVAC controller;
TCurrent is the current air temperature.
If the received cleared price is higher than the threshold, the
temperature setpoint is moved to a higher value to decrease
electricity consumption. Otherwise, the setpoint is moved to
a lower value to gain a higher comfort level. The bid price
is determined by the current air temperature. For example,
on a hot day, if the temperature is very high, the HVAC
controller will select a high bid price to increase the chance of
acceptance for its bid. The smart HVAC controllers also utilize
the average price information to adjust consumption patterns
more efficiently to avoid frequently changing the setting for
short-term variation.
2) Decentralized Market Option: The decentralized option
utilizes a decentralized middleware called Resilient Informa-
tion Architecture Platform for Smart Grid (RIAPS) [21] to
create a framework for decentralized energy trading.
The actors and high-level data-flow of this platform can be
seen in Figure 5. The typical workflow begins with producers
and consumers of power (1) posting offers to the distributed
ledger, offering to sell or buy energy for a time interval in
the future. In [14], we used Ethereum as the ledger. Solvers
monitor the ledger, and when offers are posted, they (2) use an
algorithm to match buyers to sellers. This match is (3) posted
to the ledger. The solution for an interval may be updated
Solver1 Solver2
Solvers...
Solvers...
Distributed Ledger [External to RIAPS]
(check offer and solution correctness, select best solution)
Producer DSO Consumer
1) Post Offers 1) Post Offers
2) Offer Notify 2) Offer Notify 2) Offer Notify3) Post Solution 3) Post Solution
4) Finalize
5) notify5) notify
6) exchange
Fig. 5. Data flow between actors of in Transactive Energy application.
until it is (4) finalized by the DSO. At this point, producers
and consumers are notified and will (6) exchange the amount
of power for which they were matched. RIAPS was used to
provide inter-actor communication, management services, and
time-synchronization for the actors to begin the transfer of
power at the right time.
The trading scenarios that we consider involve consumers
and prosumers that participate in a local P2P energy trading
market by posting offers to sell produced energy or to buy and
consume energy in a future time interval. An offer consists of
the quantity of energy being bought or sold, the time interval
in which the trade is to be delivered, and possibly a reservation
price, i.e., the maximum (or respectively, minimum) price at
which the buyer (or respectively, seller) is willing to trade.
We assume that each participant predicts their future power
production and consumption (e.g., based on historical data)
and does so prior to trading on the market. Moreover, each
participant is represented by an automated trading agent that
strategically posts offers to the TES management platform
(TMP) based on these predictions and the participant’s per-
sonal trading goals.
In the simplest trading scenario, the DSO sets the price p per
kWh for the local market; p is the price paid by any buyer and
received by any seller, including the DSO. The DSO can then
dynamically adjust the price p to affect the market efficiency,
which is evaluated as the number of local transactions vs.
energy demand met from a bulk supplier. Another scenario
includes a fully dynamic market where all sellers, including
the DSO, post offers that include a reservation price. Each
consumer then picks a selling offer on a first-come, first
served basis. An extension of this scenario involves double
auctions where both selling and buying offers are posted to
the TMP, which executes an automated, regulator-approved
market clearing algorithm as an immutable smart contract
on the TMP’s blockchain system. This algorithm selects the
clearing price of p within each time interval.
One of the innovative capabilities of the decentralized
trading platform is the ability to specify multiple time intervals
in selling offers, enabling the integration of battery systems for
delaying the sale or purchase of energy. Figure 6 shows the
total energy traded for different tests. We varied the prediction
window for the participants from 2 to 13. That is, in each
interval, the participants submitted offers starting from the next
2 3 5 7 10 13
2,875
2,900
2,925
2,950
Prosumer prediction window [time intervals]
To
ta
l
en
er
gy
tr
ad
ed
[k
W
h] without battery
with battery
Fig. 6. Total amount of energy traded in the entire microgrid with and without
batteries, for various prediction window lengths.
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Fig. 7. Energy generated in each interval (blue line) and energy traded to
a set of consumers in each interval (vertical bars) for the first prosumer of
the first feeder. The stacked colors show the different consumers that were
matched with the prosumer in each interval (note that the same color across
multiple intervals does not necessarily mean the same consumer). When the
energy traded exceeds the generation, the excess is drawn from the battery.
1 to 12 intervals (the current interval is always counted in
the prediction window). The experiment simulated the whole
day from the first interval starting at 0:00 (12:00 AM) to
the 95th interval ending at 23:59 (11:59 PM). As expected,
increasing the prediction window with batteries improves
performance, and without batteries has no effect on the total
amount of energy traded. This is because any production must
be dispatched within one-time interval, so the solver cannot
optimize energy usage across multiple intervals even if future
offers are available.
An example execution run of the system is shown in
Figure 7. This figure shows the energy matched per interval
for the first prosumer of the first feeder (Figure 2).
C. Network Simulator
The network simulator, as shown in Figure 8, creates
communication channels among the prosumers and enables
the simulation of cyber attacks. The network simulator is built
using the tap-bridge module of NS3; here, every container has
a bridge and is linked to a tap device in NS3. All tap devices
communicate through a virtual wireless network. Besides,
random network traffic has been added to the simulation to
mimic the real world network situation. The purpose of this
random noise is to test if the data analytics implemented
in this paper can detect the attacks in the most randomized
dataset since the real datasets would also contain such random
noise. The randomness in the dataset is equivalent to that
of a workstation in a smart grid testbed, and it consists of
web traffic and system updates. As the simulation begins,
the communication between various components is collected
using a packet sniffer tool. The collected information includes
IP addresses, port numbers, length of packets, protocol, and
number of bytes sent every five minutes.
Fig. 8. Network simulator for TESST
III. CYBER THREAT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
A centralized trading platform may be exposed to a vari-
ety of cyber-threats and privacy issues. Some attackers seek
financial gain through network-based attacks, and they will
manipulate the controllers to profit. Some attackers aim to
disturb the operation of the TES. Similar to the notable
cyber-attack against Ukrainian power systems in December
2015 [22], [23], attackers can inject malware into the market
operation system and manipulate settings, such as DLMP
limits or clearing time interval. An attacker could use a
malicious channel to eavesdrop on the power system and
can also steal critical information. Through stealing critical
information from both the market operator and prosumers,
attackers could devise a sophisticated targeted attack. They
can also conduct Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks that aim to
cause a lack of availability of information, updates, prices,
and resources. In contrast to the market operation system,
individual smart HVAC controllers do not necessarily employ
strong security mechanisms. Therefore, compromise a large
number of smart HVAC controllers either for financial gain or
to damage the system by sending massively manipulated bids
to the market operator.
During the simulation of TESST, the prosumers will submit
bids to buy or sell electricity and the market operator will col-
lect those bids and produce a clearing price. This information
is crucial for the operation of a TES. If this information is
compromised, the operation of the transactive system may be
impacted at multiple levels.
Here we explore two possible attacks that assume an at-
tacker is able to manipulate the bid price and quantity. In the
first scenario, the attacker seeks personal benefit by reducing
the bid price and quantity by 50%. If only a limited number of
prosumers launch such an attack, it will be difficult to detect
because the impact on the total demand curves is small as seen
if Figure 9.
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Fig. 9. Demand curve changes due to attacks aim for profits
In the second scenario, the attacker aims to disturb the
operation of the transactive market, which can be done by
changing the prosumers’ bids to arbitrarily high or low values.
Such drastic modifications will lead to significant changes in
clearing price, the operation of smart HVAC controllers, and
the overall demand as shown in Figure 10. This unexpected
oscillation is likely larger than the system can sustain, and
lead to a serious operational issue.
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Fig. 10. Demand curve changes due to attacks aim for disturbing system
operation
In the scenarios described above, we assume that attackers
are able to manipulate the average bid price and quantity.
Maintaining this assumption, these threats can be mitigated
through the use of multiple solvers and a distributed consensus
algorithm. If we use multiple solvers, an attacker will need
to modify the bids received by all solvers. The decentralized
market option presented previously in Section II-B2 provides
this feature, and as shown in our prior work [24], it is
resistant to solver failure. Transitioning to a decentralized
market helps us to mitigate the threats presented here, but
it also introduces additional challenges. TRANSAX addresses
problems associated with faults in the system; however, its
resistance to security threats needs further analysis. Regarding
the issue of bid manipulation, a potential solution is assigning
reputation values to actors, which enables removing misbehav-
ing actors from the system. An alternative solution is imposing
enforceable fines (e.g., by requiring security deposits) to dis-
incentivize malicious or dishonest behavior. These questions
can be addressed in detail as part of future work.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a TES testbed, called
TESST, which can simulate the operation of both centralized
and decentralized TES platform. The centralized trading plat-
form can establish all prosumers within the physical system,
but it is less resilient to cyber attack. The decentralized
trading platform is designed using blockchain, and it addresses
security issues inherent in centralized systems. The operation
and cyber-vulnerability of the centralized trading platform is
analyzed in the simulation. Through simulation results, we
demonstrated that it is relatively easy to manipulate a tradi-
tional centralized trading system and to cause financial and
possible operational issues. The decentralized trading platform
can effectively clear the market, and provide improvements to
a centralized solution, but still need to be investigated using
TESST in the future. This allows for the development of a
secure and resilient decentralized trading platform, which is
critical for the operation of TES.
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